Abstract. In this paper we present an improvement of the di erential attack on hash functions based on block ciphers. By using the speci c properties of the collision attack on hash functions, we can greatly reduce the work factor to nd a pair that follows the characteristic. We propose a new family of di erential characteristics that is especially useful in combination with our improvement. Attacks on a hash function based on DES variants reduced to 12, 13 or 15 rounds become faster than brute force collision attacks.
Introduction
Hash functions are functions that compress inputs of arbitrary length to an output of xed length n. For cryptographic applications, we impose the following properties:
1. one-wayness: given Y , it is di cult to nd an X such that h(X) = Y , and
given X and h(X), it is di cult to nd X 0 6 = X such that h(X 0 ) = h(X) 2. collision resistance: it is di cult to nd X and X 0 6 = X such that h(X) = h(X 0 ). Most hash functions are iterated hash functions: the input X is divided into t blocks X i , where each block contains b bits. The length of the input should be appended at the end. If the length of X is not a multiple of b, one uses an unambiguous padding scheme to extend the input. The hash function h can then be described as:
H i = f(X i ; H i?1 ) i = 1; 2; : : :; t: Here f is called the round function, H 0 is speci ed together with the scheme, and H t is the hashcode. Hash functions can be constructed from a block cipher algorithm, e.g., the DES FI46-77]. The main motivation for this type of construction is the minimization of design and implementation e ort. An example of a well established construction is based on the following round function f: f(X i ; H i?1 ) = DES(H i?1 ; X i ) X i ;
(1) where DES(H i?1 ; X i ) denotes the DES encryption of the plaintext X i with the key H i?1 . This scheme was proposed by S. Matyas, C. Meyer and J. Oseas in MMO85], and is described in P93a] together with eleven variants with an equivalent security level. The di erential attack however works only for four of these variants, since it requires that the cryptanalyst has explicit control over the plaintext input of the block cipher and that the key is xed.
Di erential cryptanalysis of hash functions
Di erential cryptanalysis is a powerful cryptographic tool. Its application to block ciphers (e.g., the DES) is described in BS93]. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic ideas of this method. Di erential cryptanalysis can be applied to hash functions in the same way as to the corresponding block ciphers, but there are some important di erences P93b].
{ For the case of a collision attack, we control the plaintext input. This makes the di erential attack on the hash function feasible. The di erential attack on a block cipher used as an encryption device, on the contrary, is only of theoretic interest.
{ We know the key, and sometimes we can choose the key or choose the best alternative out of a set of possible keys. We can exploit this in several ways. First, when searching for a collision, we can select those input values that follow the characteristic with probability one in certain rounds. Precomputation of a few tables allows us to choose the inputs of four or ve consecutive rounds (cf. Sect. 3). Second, the probability of some characteristics is keydependent. If we have some control over the key, we choose it to be optimal for our characteristic, otherwise we can select a characteristic with optimal probability for the given key. Third, we can use an early abort strategy: as soon as we see that the pair is a wrong pair, we can discard it. For most inputs we need to compute only a few rounds.
{ There are more restrictions on the characteristic: in block cipher analysis we only want to know the output of the most probable characteristic. For hash functions, we need a characteristic that produces a collision, i.e., the output exor of the round function f must be zero. For our example, this means that the output exor of the block cipher has to match the input exor. Moreover, the characteristic must cover all the rounds: 1R-, 2R-, or 3R-attacks do not apply. This reduces the probability of the characteristic.
{ We need only one right pair to nd a collision or a second preimage.
In the rest of this paper we will only consider collision attacks.
Choosing inputs
In a collision attack, we can choose the input values (or messages) arbitrarily. We can use this freedom to enhance our chance of success. A naive approach is to select messages that will follow the proposed characteristic in the rst two rounds with probability one. In this section we present an algorithm that enables us to pass four rounds with probability one. By a very simple extension of the algorithm, it is possible to pass ve rounds. Fig. 1 Step 1: Calculate table T 1 that lists all values of R 1 that follow the characteristic in round 1. Idem for tables T 2 and T 3 that list the values of F 2 and R 3 respectively. Since in each round only a few S-boxes are active, these tables can be reduced in size by the use of \don't cares": we don't care what the inputs are of non-active S-boxes and thus we do not specify these values.
Step 2: Match these three tables and look for all possible values of (R 1 ; F 2 ; R 3 ).
Step 3: Calculate table T 4 with all values for R 4 . For every (R 1 ; F 2 ; R 3 ) \invert" round two and try to match the possible values of R 2 , F (R 3 ) and R 4 .
Step 4: For each match found, calculate the inputs to the rst round.
By calculating an extra table we can precede these four rounds with an extra round before round one.
Good characteristics
It has already been observed in P93b, Kn94] that it is a non trivial problem to nd good even-round characteristics for the hash function (1). One-round iterative characteristics can have an arbitrary number of rounds, but they have a very low probability of 1 234 per round (cf. Fig. 2 ). Two-round iterative characteristics have the highest probability for seven rounds or more Ma94], but in hash functions they can only be applied to DES variants with an odd number of rounds. This can be concluded from Fig. 2 . Each 0 round has on average a probability of 1 234 . Dependent on the round key, this probability becomes 1 146 or 1 585 . For 13 rounds, the attack requires the same number of encryptions as a brute-force collision attack based on the birthday paradox ( 2 32:5 ). However, since the DES has 16 rounds, any serious attack requires a characteristic with an even number of rounds. In P93b], B. Preneel proposed to search for an input value that is a good x-point ( ) and a good building block for an iterative characteristic (0 ). In Kn94], L. Knudsen shows that such a characteristic cannot have a high probability. The problem is that all with a good probability for 0 have low probability for , and vice versa. L. Knudsen therefore proposes the use of an iterative characteristic based on a special four round building block (cf. Fig. 3 ). This building block has probability 2 ?23:6 averaged over all keys, and 2 ?23:0 for optimal keys. For a DES variant with 8 rounds the workfactor is comparable to a brute-force collision search. Our idea is the following: we take a with good probability for 0 . Instead of inserting one round, we insert ve`transient' rounds (cf. Fig. 4 ). These ve rounds have a low probability that is however better than the x-point construction. This is not a problem since we choose the input values of these transient rounds in such a way that they are passed with probability one. A computer search has indicated that the best transient rounds have a symmetrical pattern. For our computer search, we considered the 50 's with the best 0 probability. For each all possible 's and 's were examined. The best combination is = 00196000 and = = 04450180. The probabilities of the di erent rounds are given in Table 1 . Note that there exist 's that yield a lower probability, for which the optimal and are di erent. The fact that the probability of these rounds depends on the key, can be exploited to reduce the work/success ratio: we can eliminate the keys that give the characteristic a low (or zero) probability. We call keys that give a non-zero probability near-optimal. For our choice of and (cf . Fig 1) , 4.5% of the keys are near-optimal. Stronger criteria for near-optimal keys are possible. Table 2 gives the theoretical probabilities and workfactors for DES variants with various number of rounds. The probability of the characteristic is given for near-optimal keys. The workfactors are calculated as follows: the reciprocal of the probability of the rounds where we do not choose the input values multiplied by a reduction factor that takes the early abort strategy into account. The numbers for DES variants with an odd number of rounds are obtained by choosing input values for ve arbitrarily chosen consecutive rounds. The characteristic is the best 2-round iterative characteristic of BS93]. For less than seven rounds of the DES, iterative characteristics are not the best ones. Instead of building upon the iterative characteristic one could search for a characteristic of the form: optimal six round characteristic { four transient rounds (inputs chosen) { optimal six round characteristic.
With the current even-round characteristics, we make no use of the fact that we can pass ve rounds. This can easily be seen on Fig. 4 : the four central rounds with the worst probability are anked by two rounds with probability one. Nothing can be gained by calculating one of these two rounds. Maybe there exist good characteristics of the form: optimal ve round characteristic { ve transient rounds (inputs chosen) { optimal six round characteristic. We believe this could bring the work factor of the di erential attack on the variant with 16 rounds down to the value of a brute force collision attack.
